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THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT: A HARMLESS RELIC FROM THE POST-RECONSTRUCTION ERA OR A LEGAL IMPEDIMENT TO TRANSFORMATION?
As originally passed, the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) read, "From and after the passage of this act it shall not be lawful to employ any part of the Army of the United States, as a posse comitatus, or otherwise, for the purpose of executing the laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances as such employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the Constitution or by act of Congress." 1 With the exception of a short amendment adding the Air Force, the PCA remains substantially as it was when Congress added its language to the Army appropriations bill in 1878. Only 52 words long, it appears deceivingly straightforward. As this paper will demonstrate, the Act was overly broad at its inception and it has increasingly become both ambiguous and complex.
The Secretary of Defense should seek repeal of PCA because the ambiguity of the Act causes widespread confusion at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of our military.
Although the law has little practical effect on its intended purpose, the complexity and rigidity of the Act present a formidable obstacle to our nation's flexibility and adaptability. We can ill afford such anachronistic restraints at a time when we face an unpredictable enemy with the proven capability of causing unforeseen catastrophic events.
The possibility that such future events may call for Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) requires that we review the efficacy of the PCA. This paper will document the historical context of the PCA, clearly explain the parameters of the law, and provide an analysis of the PCA's value in today's security environment. An analysis of the Act will reveal that although the policy goal behind the Act is generally sound and desirable, Congress could have better implemented its intent on this subject through means other than a criminal statute.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The PCA is a federal criminal law that prohibits using federal troops to enforce civil laws, under penalty of fine and or imprisonment. Congress originally enacted the PCA in 1878, as an amendment to the Army appropriation bill, after the Reconstruction of the Southern States following the Civil War. According to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, when Congress passed the Act, they "expressly intended to prevent United States Marshals, on their own initiative, from calling on the Army for assistance in enforcing federal law."
2 Others have argued that Congress intended the law to "prevent the military forces of the U.S. from becoming a national police force or guardia civil. 3 Whether or not they intended it to be so broad, the PCA generally prohibits any person from using the Army or Air Force to enforce civil law, unless otherwise provided for in law.
EARLY USE OF THE ARMY IN CIVIL DISTURBANCES
The military has a long tradition of being the force of last resort to quell riots. Their use in the United States traces back as early as the New York City Doctors' Riots in April of 1788.
4
The riot started when wide spread reports of doctors robbing graves for medical research circulated throughout the city. A large mob marched on the New York City Hospital, where the doctors had taken refuge from angry demonstrators. Having no police force large enough to control the crowd, New York City officials asked the Governor to call out the militia to disperse the mob. The commanding officer ordered several volleys of musket fired directly into the crowd before they dispersed. The militia remained on the streets for several days before they were able to restore calm and order. James McFarlane, died in the action. 6 An armed force of 7,000 "malcontents" marched on Pittsburgh on 1 August, intending to capture Fort Pitt. Although the mob dispersed before attacking the Fort, Governor Mifflin asked the President for help on 4 August 1794.
Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton had fought closely with General
Washington during the Revolutionary War. Hamilton estimated that the Government would need 12,000 men to suppress the violence. 7 In his estimation, the disturbance was more than a spontaneous riot, but less than a "rebellion." 8 The number of troops called for exceeded the capability of the Pennsylvania Militia. Three days later, President Washington issued a proclamation directing, "all persons being insurgents, as aforesaid, are commanded on or before the first day of September next, to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes" by 1 September. 9 He relied on the "Calling Forth Act" 10 as his authority to mobilize a militia force of 15,000 men to engage the estimated 16,000 rioters.
He met with the troops in Carlisle, PA in October to give them their orders. He directed them to overcome any armed opposition and to support the civil officers in the means of executing the laws. The troops met no resistance and the civil disturbance ended as soon as the troops deployed.
11 President Washington's action in employing federal troops established a precedent for using the Army to quell riots and suppress rebellion. As it is the President's duty under the Constitution to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" and "insure domestic tranquility", the tradition has continued to this day.
HISTORY OF THE PCA
The history of the PCA really begins with the Judiciary Act of 1789, which established the Federal District Courts. 12 In that act, Congress provided each district court with a US Marshal.
They gave the US Marshals authority to employ the common law "power of the county" or "posse comitatus" to assist them in capturing fugitives from federal justice and to enforce the orders of the court. As a rule, US Marshals did not make a practice of using the military to form their posse. When needed by US Marshal's, the request for military support would go through the military chain of command and would require approval by the President. When supporting the US Marshals, the Army would maintain its chain of command and perform the mission for a short period.
13
The practice did not become controversial until Congress enacted the Slave Trade Act of
1850.
14 After Congress enacted the Slave Trade Act, US Marshals began arresting fugitive slaves in the northern United States who had escaped from slavery states in the South. US Marshals became the object of scorn and outrage and were often the victim of physical assaults. They soon began turning to the military for help with greater frequency. The military understandably resisted participation in the unpopular practice of assisting in the capture of runaway slaves. In 1854, Attorney General Caleb Cushing rendered an opinion declaring that the practice of impressing the military (without the approval of their chain of command) into federal posses was legal. 15 The US Marshal's authority had been somewhat vague and ambiguous until Attorney General Cushing issued his opinion on the issue, stating that:
"A marshal of the United States, when opposed in the execution of his duty by unlawful combinations, has authority to summon the entire able-bodied force of his precinct as a posse comitatus. This authority comprehends, not only bystanders and other citizens generally, but any and all organized armed force, whether militia of the State or officers, soldiers, sailors, and marines of the United States."
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It is important to note that this issue revolved around the propriety of US Federal Marshals using the military to assist in the capture of criminals wanted for federal crimes and the compulsion of military forces to protect federal courts and judges during times of civil unrest.
The concern raised was not compulsory participation of the military in the posses raised by local sheriffs or police. Local officials never had the authority to summon the aid of federal troops. "The Legislature of the United States will be obliged by this provision, once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents."
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The Navy has no such restriction on its budget because Congress saw it as necessary to ensure free trade. They did not view the Navy as a threat to liberty. The PCA may appear to be a straightforward reaction to President Grant's action after the Civil War, but it reflects the larger issue of Americans' discomfort with a powerful army on its soil. Over the past 120 years, the PCA has become symbolic of America's distrust for a powerful army. When interpreting the provisions of the PCA, courts have been openly hostile to the idea of using the military to enforce civil law. When the opportunity arises to interpret congressional intent on the matter, 
WHAT THE PCA PROSCRIBES
The text of the PCA today is not much different than it was in 1878 (see page 1). It is still relatively short and appears straightforward:
"Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
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As straightforward as the Act appears, it is far more complex and perplexing than meets the eye. As an example, the courts have found several circumstances where federally paid soldiers are not in violation of the PCA, even though they are acting contrary to the plain language of the statute. The courts have applied three different tests to determine if a person's conduct is subject to the PCA (See Appendix 1).
WHEN THE LAW DOESN'T APPLY
Courts have found that the PCA does not apply to:
• Extraterritorial conduct of a military force.
• Indirect involvement in civil law enforcement.
• Enforcement of civil law for civilians on a military installation.
• Commanders, when exercising their inherent authority to protect their installation from attack or take immediate steps to protect the loss of life.
• The National Guard, when used in a "state status."
• Extraordinary cases where the President employs his Constitutional authority to maintain order.
• Conduct or actions that have been specifically exempted by Congress. would likely advise their commander that the order was unlawful and that if they followed it, they could be violating the PCA.
THE LAW DOES NOT APPLY TO THE NATIONAL GUARD, UNLESS "FEDERALIZED"
Perhaps the most confusing aspect of the Act to the average American (and to the average soldier) is the fact that a National Guardsman who wears the same Army or Air Force issue uniform and markings as active federal forces, is not subject to the PCA, when in a "state status." Of course, the public has no way of knowing whether the soldier is in a "state status."
The courts have held that even though the Federal Government is paying a soldier's salary and providing them with the uniform and equipment of the regular army, the PCA does not apply to National Guardsmen, unless the President orders them to active duty. 53 The rationale for this finding is that the Congress never intended to limit the ability of state governors to use their militia to enforce state law. Although this makes perfect sense to attorneys, governors and lawmakers, it tends to confound troops, their leaders, and members of the public.
DOESN'T APPLY WHEN CONTRARY TO THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
By the terms of the law itself, the PCA does not apply when the President acts consistent requires the President to issue a proclamation, ordering the insurgents to "disperse and retire peaceably to their abodes" before employing any of the previous three sections. 58 Although modern day proponents of the PCA often point to these types of situations as valid examples of why the PCA is necessary, 59 none of these events would be subject to the PCA, as they would each be within the President's constitutional authority to restore order. The irony of these incidents is that the PCA could not prevent the very thing that the PostReconstruction Congress hoped the law would address -A U.S. President enforcing civil law in a southern state, by use of federal troops. If a state were to try to prevent African-Americans from voting today, there is little doubt that a President would employ federal troops to ensure free elections, just as President Grant did in 1876.
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Congress has carved out several specific exceptions to the PCA. Among the more notable are the disaster relief and protection of public health and safety provisions of the Stafford Act. Other statutes grant authority to provide certain assistance to customs officials and for sanctioned counter drug activities. The Stafford Act is important because it gives the President "broad discretion to find that a major disaster exists, requiring emergency response."
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There are several valid, but lesser used exceptions to the PCA listed in Appendix 2. The fact that there is no comprehensive list of these exceptions adds to the complexity of the Act. This strengthens the argument that a criminal statute is the wrong tool to implement congressional intent in this area.
POLICY GOALS DISTINGUISHED FROM LAW
It is important to distinguish the PCA statute from the policy goal of prohibiting US military forces from enforcing civil law. There is a variety of means available to implement policy.
Enacting a federal statute is the most rigid and inflexible method available to the government, short of a Constitutional Amendment. Congress can, and often does, pass non-binding resolutions, declaring its intent on a particular policy issue or matters of public concern.
Congress can even pass a law directing the President or an agency head to publish certain rules on a particular topic. 
THE POLICY GOAL IS SOUND
The United States has a strong tradition of civilian primacy in domestic matters. As The United States has a long history of limiting the size of its federal law enforcement, in large part, because of the perception of the potential for abuse. 68 As the federal government increases its size, we are often reminded that our "Founding Fathers never envisioned a national police power. Indeed, they were skeptical about general federal jurisdiction." 69 As an arm of the Federal Government, the military is less susceptible to local political influence than local and state law enforcement. While some would see this as an advantage for operational efficiency, it creates discomfort with citizens who wish to participate in government decisions that effect their lives. The stronger the military presence at home and the more legal power it has to participate in domestic matters, the higher the perceived potential for abuse.
The second argument in favor of the policy behind the PCA is that the Army should focus on its primary mission instead of enforcing civil law. Since military units only have a finite time to train to a myriad of tasks, any additional mission requirements will necessarily reduce the amount of training time available for those tasks. Time spent away from training translates to lower proficiency on war fighting tasks. Therefore, we can expect the military to resist any attempt to support law enforcement at home. Although it is understandable, supporting the continued existence of the PCA for these reasons alone is shortsighted and dangerously parochial. Note however, that military police units conduct law enforcement duties as one of their wartime tasks.
The third reason why the policy is sound is that, with the exception of military police units, The Los Angeles Riot is but one example of the difficulty of applying the PCA in the field. Others, like directly supporting law enforcement officers during times of emergency and confusion, are more problematic for the soldier in the field. Not only are the facts sometimes difficult to apply to the law, but also, intuitively, soldiers want to help. As a matter of public policy, America does not want commanders to question their orders to assist civil authorities.
The PCA interjects an unnecessary degree of confusion into already confusing situations.
THE PCA AS A SHIELD TO AVOID CIVILIAN ENTANGLEMENTS
Since Reconstruction, the military has loathed performing domestic law enforcement duties. 86 The PCA provides the Department of Defense with a convenient shield to protect it from missions that it does not want. On occasion, the Army has misused the PCA to avoid providing assistance to civilian law enforcement. 87 Former Secretary of Defense John Deutch once remarked that the PCA was not a barrier preventing military response to a genuine threat, but rather a bureaucratic reason not to do something perceived as less than a genuine threat. . 90 Regardless of the importance of homeland defense to our national security, the focus of our military will continue to be on fighting and winning our nation's wars overseas. To those in the Defense Department who are concerned about losing focus on war fighting, the PCA serves as a comforting legal impediment preventing the military from being distracted from their focus on wars overseas.
THE PCA SERVES AS A LEGAL IMPEDIMENT TO TRANSFORMATION
The Constitutional mandate for our military is to provide for the common defense. The
President's National Security Strategy (NSS) designates homeland security as the most important of all security interests. 91 The National Military Strategy (NMS) lists homeland defense as the most important priority of the military today. The strategy adopted by the President and by the Department of Defense for securing the homeland is to project power overseas, attacking, and destroying threats before they threaten the US homeland. Yet when facing an agile, thinking and versatile adversary we may not always be able to address the threat before we find it has reached our soil. The PCA interferes with the Nation's ability to defend itself against an adaptable, agile, and determined asymmetric enemy.
The PCA presents a legal impediment to agility, a hallmark of our transforming military.
We face the likelihood that our future enemies will adapt to our doctrine in innovative ways to create and exploit our weaknesses. We must be agile enough to stay ahead of our enemy's ability to adapt in order to maintain dominance across the full spectrum of combat. We expect to face asymmetrical state and non-state actors in the future. Such is the enemy we find ourselves opposing today. President Bush recently made public his direction to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and his authority to use lethal force against specific enemy targets overseas. 92 Extension of this authority to the Continental United States (CONUS) presents a vexing problem. Current law prohibits the CIA from engaging in covert operations at home.
This puts the burden on other agencies or the military. Harold Hongju Koh, a professor of international law at Yale University, recently remarked that, "The inevitable complication of a politically declared but legally undeclared war is the blurring of the distinction between enemy combatants and other non-state actors." 93 This is not news to military officers who have observed the change in paradigm between crime and war, and are grappling with how to approach it. 94 Certainly, the lethality of terrorist weapons grows greater every day. This blurring of distinctions between enemy combatants, criminals, terrorists and other non-state actors, increases the onerous task of distinguishing lawful from unlawful actions under the PCA.
If our next battle takes place where our greatest vulnerability exists -at home the proper military force to respond may be the National Guard. One of the advantages cited in using the National Guard for Homeland Security is their inapplicability to the PCA. 95 Certainly, the National Guard provides a valuable resource that must be included in any plans for the defense of our homeland. In fact, the Constitutional mandate of the National Guard or "Militia" is to "execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." 96 Resource constraints and cross-border jurisdictional issues make the National Guard a poor candidate for this type of federal mission at present. It is unwise to plan to leave the National Guard in a state status simply to avoid the provisions of the PCA. In the war on terror, situations change quickly and our military must have the agility to adapt just as quickly. The PCA is a legal impediment to that adaptability. Our nation needs a force that is capable of implementing the National Security
Strategy within the territorial boundaries of the United States. With additional planning and resources, the National Guard may be the right force. The message sent by Congress and the Administration will be that we are prepared to use any means at our disposal to protect the American public. We recognize the inherent danger in using the military in a domestic role and will therefore clearly state our intent and closely monitor the situation for abuses.
CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATION
At the time Congress enacted the PCA it served two purposes. First, it was an expression of Congress' distaste for using the military in a civil law enforcement role. Secondly, it ended the practice of US Marshals using the military to assist them in apprehending fugitives. The 36 "The Army and The Militia," New York Times, 11 June 1878, editorial page. 37 In 1878, Secretary of War, George McCrary, complained of the lack of flexibility in the Act in his annual report to Congress. He wrote, "During the year numerous attacks have been made upon the mail-coaches in New Mexico and Arizona, for purposes of robbery and plunder; and while I have been of the opinion that the mails of the United States may be defended by the use of troops, I have been obliged to give instructions that they cannot, without disregarding the act of Congress, be employed to aid the officers of the law in capturing the robbers after they have committed the crime. In doing so they would act as a posse comitatus, and this is nowhere by law "expressly authorized." U. 57 "The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it--(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or (2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws. In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution." Insurrection Act, U.S. Code, vol.10, sec. 333 (2003) .
